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CASE NOTES
LAW OF THE SEA-The Continental Shelf-United States Proprietary Claim
To The Continental Shelf Gives Rise To A New Public Domain.
United States v. Ray, 294 F. Supp. 532 (S.D. Fla. 1969).

A few years ago a Louisiana contractor named Louis M.
Ray and a group of investors embarked upon a scheme to
create an ocean resort complex upon lands heretofore untapped for private enterprise, to wit: a partially submerged
reef approximately five miles off the Florida coast. The
plan was to create a twenty acre artificial island by dredging
operations which would start upon the receipt of a permit
from the Secretary of the Army. The permit was denied,
whereupon the entrepreneurs commenced dredging operations anyway, presumably on the theory that they were in
international waters and, hence beyond the jurisdictional
bounds controlled by United States permit requirements. The
United States Government promptly brought a suit to enjoin
the defendant's further activity in the area, whereupon the
court granted a temporary restraining order on April 21,
1965.' Atlantis Development Corp., Ltd., a Bahamian Corporation which had previously engaged in a somewhat similar operation on the very same reef, filed an application to
intervene. The entrepreneurs thus maintained they were, in
fact, creating colonies upon the reefs, which were islands in
the high seas, and subject only to international law. The
Government, on the other hand, contended that the reefs were
not islands but, instead, natural resources of the Outer Continental Shelf's seabed and subsoil and thus, well within the
United States jurisdiction as set forth in the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953.2 The district court held
that the reefs are not islands but seabed; therefore, any artificial islands or fixed structures erected thereon are subject
to the jurisdiction and control of the United States as part of
the seabed and subsoil of the Outer Continental Shelf, hence,
1.
2.

United States v. Ray, 281 F. Supp. 876 (S.D.
67 Stat. 462, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-43 (1964).

Fla. 1965).
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no private individual can acquire any proprietary claim as
against the United States.'
THE LEGAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF

The developmental stage of ocean law pertaining to the
Continental Shelf has been slow and, to some extent, scant,
both internationally as well as domestically. In the international area it was as late as the close of the Seventeenth Century that the first major concept, "freedom of the seas", became firmly established, thus setting the stage for surface
zone demarcation and ocean bottom status.'
The zone concept evolved out of the limitation of "territorial waters" upon the phrase "freedom of the seas",
whereupon, the remaining "free sea" became the high seas
zone. The territorial sea, that water which a state exercises
sovereignty over, was defined as a three mile zone, or belt,
that surrounded every coastal state. The definition was premised on the maxim "that area which a state can effectively
defend from shore" which in turn was defined in terms of
that defense, the range of a cannon shot.'
Far later in time, a third zone evolved. This area,
labeled the "contiguous zone" was a larger buffer zone established for states to more effectively enforce their imnmigration and customs laws as well as for defense purposes.
This was an additional nine mile belt for law enforcement,
but not, as is the case with territorial waters, subject to plenary or sovereign control by a coastal state.'
The status of the ocean bottom under these zones was not
as well agreed upon historically as was the status of their
surface water counterparts. There evolved three basic
theories 7 which were expounded by international lawyers
and are as follows:
3. United States v. Ray, 294 F. Supp. 532 (S.D. Fla. 1969).
4. Griffin, Emerging Law of Ocean Space, 1 INT. LAW. 548 (1967).
5. 48 C.J.S. International Law § 7 (1947).

6. Griffin supra note 4, at 553.
7. Pardo, Limits of the Continental Shelf-And Beyond, 62 AM. Soc. INT L.
PROC. 216 (1968).
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1) res omnium communis, common property of all nations such as the high seas,
2) res nullius, land presently unappropriated, yet capable of acquisition by a state, such as uncolonized islands,
3) the recent trend of distinguishing between seabed
and subsoil by labeling the seabed res communis and
the subsoil res nullius, such as the lease of oil or mineral rights without ownership of the land itself.
United States domestic ocean law used as its foundation
the international common law, whereupon a new age of concepts evolved out of case law as well as statutory laws in attempts to solve new areas of conflict brought about by technological advances. The international community in turn recognized the effectiveness of many of these domestic laws which
thereby became the foundation for the ever expanding international body of statutory law. Chronologically, the first major
step was the Truman Proclamation of 1945' in which the
term "Continental Shelf" was born as the President proclaimed United States jurisdiction and control over its adjacent continental shelf. Next, in that same year, the United
States brought suit against California,9 as the offshore oil
boom was in full swing, in an effort to establish Government
ownership of the submerged lands beneath the three mile
territorial belt. The Court held for the United States and
against California, thus, vesting title to these offshore submerged lands in the Federal Government instead of within
the States.
Congress replied to the Court's decision in California a
few years later by passing the Submerged Lands Act of
1953.1" This Statute acted as an effective reversal of the
Court's decision by ceding to the individual coastal states the
United States proprietary interests in the submerged lands.
Later in 1953 Congress passed the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act," which attempted to expand and define the inter8.
9.
10.
11.

Presidential Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12303, Sept. 28, 1945.
United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
67 Stat. 29, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1303-15 (1964).
43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-43 (1964).
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ests involved in the Truman Proclamation,' 2 and the Sub-

merged Lands Act.'"
Internationally, by 1956 most of the world community
followed suit by acquiesing to the United States claims, and
further, by claiming similar jurisdiction over their own continental shelves. The Geneva Convention on the Law of the
Sea met two years later in 1958 in an effort to codify into
international agreement as much of the quickly developing
law as possible. The most important agreement that arose
was Article I which defined the Continental Shelf and the
right of every coastal state to maintain jurisdiction and control over its own adjacent continental shelf for the purposes
of developing the natural resources thereon. 1"
A compilation of the domestic and international law that
had evolved by 1960 produced an era of uncertainty as to just
what proprietary interests were involved in submerged lands;
particularly the newest accessable frontier-The Continental
Shelf. Little beyond theorization was done internationally
after the Geneva Convention, but domestically a State and
Federal conflict arose over submerged lands rights whereby a
line of United States cases started the process of defining
ocean bottom interests by first defining interests on the Continental Shelf.
The first case of importance was United States v. Louisiana,5 in which the Government sought to stop the five Gulf
States from authorizing offshore oil wells beyond the three
mile territorial belt, in order that the wealth of these regions
could be harvested by the Federal Government. The Court's
holding was for the most part in favor of the Government,
but more importantly, the case effectively defined most of
the interests ceded to the states under the Submerged Lands
Act.
The next case that arose was the "second" United States
6 in which the Government sought to resolve
v. California,"
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

SupYna note 8.
43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-15 (1964).
Griffin, supra note 4, at 551.
363 U.S. 1 (1960).
381 U.S. 139 (1965).
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the remainder of the issues left unsettled by Louisiana in the
area of demarcation of state and federal submerged land
interests. The Government renewed its 1945 suit by amended
complaint in order to stop California's liberal interpretation
of "inland waters" which allowed the state to drill for oil
up to fifty miles off shore, yet still within the bays claimed
by California. The Court held that "inland waters" and
other terms were left undefined by the Submerged Lands
Act because Congress had left that task to the courts. The
Court modified the original Special Masters Report and left
the parties to submit propsed decrees.17
The culmination of Californiaand the state-federal conflict was the supplemental decree entered January 31, 1966."
The decree defined into black letter law most of the terms
involved in submerged land conflicts, thus crystalizing into
sharper focus the demarcation line between state and federal
rights.
THaE SECoND PHASE--UNITED STATES V. RAY

The next logical phase of Continental Shelf Development,
a step beyond the state-federal conflict over oil resource exploitation, was the private enterprise-federal conflict over
colonization rights. The case which embodied this step was
United States v. Ray 9 wherein two groups of enterpreneurs,
one of United States origin, the other of Bahamian origin,"
realized that colonization was now technologically feasible
on some areas of the United States' Outer Continental Shelf.
The Government, in an attempt to avert certain obvious
consequences which would result from such colonization, decided to test the extent of power inherent in the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. Couching its suit in the terms of
the Act 2 the Government argued that the reefs were in fact
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. at 177.
382 U.S. 448 (1966).
United States v. Ray, supra note 3.
It is significant that Atlantis is not of United States origin for the reason
that as a Bahamian corporation its claim effectively joins international
colonization rights into issue.
21. 43 U.S.C. § 1333 Section 4 (a) (1) (1964). The Government sought to
bring the activity within the following language of the statute:
The constitution and laws and civil and political jurisdiction of the
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natural resources of the seabed or subsoil of the Outer Continental Shelf. 2 The suit, if successful, would subject the
entrepreneur's actions to United States jurisdiction and control and therefore, the regulatory body of the Secretary of
the Army.2"
The defendants and intervenors premised their answer
on the argument that the reefs are islands which beyond the
three mile limit would be res nullius, as are all unclaimed
islands, and subject to international colonization.2" The issue
presented to the Court then became one concerning the character of the reefs, a seemingly easy question of law yet pregnant with numerous ramifications no matter which way the
question was decided. This was evidenced by the court's
deliberation on the decision for one year, whereupon the
court found for the Government.
The courts resolution of the issue thus presented allows
the theme inherent in Ray to emerge-United States plenary
control and jurisdiction of the Continental Shelf. In reaching its decision the court was placed in the anomalous position of being able to pre-select the successful litigant since
the character of the reefs, heretofore undefined,2 5 could be
defined just as easily as a natural resource as not. The basic
issue was therefore not, as the court suggests, the character
of the reefs,2 6 but, instead, whether or not the United States
should have jurisdiction sufficient to enable absolute United
States control of submerged lands such as the reefs in Ray.

22.
23.

24.
25.

26.

United States are extended to the subsoil and seabed of the Outer
Continental Shelf and to all artificial islands and fixed structures
which may be erected thereon for the purpose of exploring for resources therefrom ...
United States v. Ray, supra note 3, at 536.
43 U.S.C. § 1333 (f) (1964). This act encompasses the authority which
had previously been set forth in Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act
of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 403 and states as follows:
The authority of the Secretary of the Army to prevent obstruction
to navigation in the navigable waters of the United States is extended
to artificial islands and fixed structures located on the Outer Continental Shelf.
United States v. Ray, supra note 3, at 536. The intervenor cross claimed
against the defendants with the additional argument that it had superior
title through a prior claim.
The Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1301 (e) (1964) and the Geneva
Convention on the Continental Shelf Article 2 (4) (1958) define natural
resources according to traditionally exploitable items of which coral reefs
are conspicuous by their absence from enumerated lists of such items.
United States v. Ray, supra note 3, at 538.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol5/iss2/12

6

Lattimer: Law of the Sea - The Continental Shelf - United States Proprietar

1970

CASE

NoTEs

The court seemingly felt that this question should be answered in the affirmative for obvious national security reasons 2 7 and so proceeded to fashion an opinion which not only
complied with the requirement of stare decisis but also reached a result palatable to international authorities and United
States higher courts.
First, the court pointed out that the reefs do not fit the
definition of an island if strictly construed under the mean
high water test,2" thus leaving the reefs subject to some definition. However, if liberally construed they rather conveniently fit the definition of a natural resource of the seabed
and subsoil of the Continental Shelf." So defined, the reefs
are an exploitable resource and are therefore subject to the
exclusive control of the United States as set forth in the Convention of the Continental Shelf."°
The rather obvious inference is that if these reefs can be
so easily defined as encompassed under the proprietary claim
sections of both national (Shelf Act) and international
(Shelf Convention) law, the entire Shelf has effectively been
placed under United States sovereign jurisdiction.
In order to avoid the prospect of international disapproval of such a United States claim to the entire Shelf
sounding in fee simple, the Court went to great lengths to define the nature of that interest as some sort of quasi-sovereign interest-based upon existing law. 1 The court states in
conclusion that:
Whatever proprietary interest exists with respect
to these reefs belongs to the United States under
both national (Shelf Act) and international (Shelf
Convention) law. Although this interest may be
27. The court ends its opinion with a comment that points out the necessity of
reaching a result favorable to the Government-that conceivably a contrary
result would allow alien missile bases to spring up in the waters a few
miles off the United States coast.
28. United States v. Ray, supra note 3, at 538.
29. Id.
30. The Geneva Conference of 1958 adopted the Shelf Convention, wherein
Article 2 (1) states that "the coastal State exercises over the continental
shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its
natural resources."
31. United States v. Ray, supra note 3, at 540-41.
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limited, it is nevertheless the only interest recognized by law, and such interest in the United States
precludes
the claims of the defendants and inter82
venor.

The Court in holding that there was no attainable fee
simple title vis-a-vis these reefs and that all the rest of the
rights were vested in the United States, made a rather unique
conveyance-by-decree of these lands which might be stated as
"to the United States for life remainder to God".
CONCLUSION
Out of the preceeding perusal of ocean laws as affect
the Continental Shelf a definite pattern of development becomes clear. The needs of one nation state dictate legal refinements upon their own adjacent shelf. Once these asserted
laws appear practical and sound to other nation states there
is general acquiescence which, when formalized, codifies the
individual assertions into an international body of law.
It is submitted that Ray is the catalyst for the carving
of a new public domain by forcing an issue which effectively
shows the United States' need in laying sovereign claim to the
submerged lands of the entire Continental Shelf. While the
exact technique utilized by the court may be subject to criticism as confusing the exact nature of interests involved upon
the shelf,8" the inherent theme is both valuable and sound.
True, the international community has to acquiesce to such a
claim by the United States but the best selling point is the
fact that all nation states with Continenal Shelves will undergo a similar reasoning process as he court experienced in Ray
which in turn will compel them to make similar claims. It
remains to be seen whether the United States will reach out
and grasp that which history has told her is hers for the
asking.
GREGORY Mf. LATTIMER
32. Id. at 642.
33. Comment, International Law-Continental Shelf-Proprietary Interest of
United States in Contniental Shelf Precludes Claims of Acquisition by
Private Entrepreneurs. 6 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 487 (1969).
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